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Topic 1. THE AGE OF REASON PHILOSOPHY 
(XVII–XVIII CENTURIES) 
 
1. Empiricism and sensualism in the philosophical teachings 
of F. Bacon, T. Hobbes, J. Locke. 
2. The essence of rationalism in XVII–XVIII century. 
R. Descartes’, B. Spinoza’s and H. Leibniz’s teachings about 
substance. 
 
The basic concepts and categories: picture of the world, 
scientific method, empiricism, sensualism, rationalism, idols, 
induction, deduction, innate idea, ‘empty cabinet’ (‘tabula rasa’), 
substance, monad, dualism, pluralism, determinism. 
Methodological Recommendations on Seminar 
Employments Conducting 
Against the background of humanistic scholarship, the rise of 
the new science and the challenge of skepticism, modern 
philosophers were preoccupied with philosophical issues in several 
distinct areas: 
Epistemology. Can human beings achieve any certain 
knowledge of the world? If so, what are the sources upon which 
genuine knowledge depends? In particular, how does sense 
perception operate in service of human knowledge?  
Metaphysics. What kinds of things ultimately compose the 
universe? In particular, what are the distinctive features of human 
nature and how do they function in relation to each other and the 
world at large? Does god exist?  
Ethics. By what standards should human conduct be 
evaluated? Which actions are morally right and what motivates us to 
perform them? Is moral life possible without the support of religious 
belief?  
Metaphilosophy. Does philosophy have a distinctive place in 
human life generally? What are the proper aims and methods of 
philosophical inquiry?  
Although not every philosopher addressed all of these issues 
and some philosophers had much more to say about some issues than 
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others, our survey of modern philosophy will trace the content of 
their responses to questions of these basic sorts. 
British philosopher Francis Bacon (1561–1626), for 
example, expressed the modern spirit well in a series of works 
designed to replace stultified. Bacon did not propose an actual 
philosophy, but rather a method of developing philosophy. In his 
opus ‘Novum Organum’ (1620), he argued that although philosophy 
at the time used the deductive syllogism to interpret nature, the 
philosopher should instead proceed through inductive reasoning from 
fact to axiom to law (induction is a method of reasoning by which a 
general conclusion is drawn from a set of premises, based mainly on 
experimental evidence). Before beginning this induction, the inquirer 
is to free his or her mind from certain false notions or tendencies 
which distort the truth. These are called ‘Idols’ (idola) and are of 
four kinds: 
Idols of the Tribe, which arise from human nature generally, 
encourage us to over-estimate our own importance within the greater 
scheme of things by supposing that everything must truly be as it 
appears to us.  
Idols of the Cave, which arise from our individual natures, 
lead each one of us to extrapolate inappropriately from his or her own 
case to a hasty generalization about humanity, life or nature 
generally.  
Idols of the Marketplace, which arise from the use of 
language as a means of communication, interfere with an unbiased 
perception of natural phenomena by forcing us to express everything 
in traditional terms.  
Idols of the Theatre, which arise from academic philosophy 
itself, produces an inclination to build and defend elaborate systems 
of thought that are founded on little evidence from ordinary 
experience. 
Once we notice the effects that these ‘Idols’ have upon us, 
Bacon supposed, we are in a position to avoid them and our 
knowledge of nature will accordingly improve. 
In a more positive spirit, Bacon proposed a patient method 
borrowed from the practice of the new scientists of the preceding 
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generation. First, we must use our senses (properly freed from the 
idols) to collect and organize many particular instances from 
experience. Resisting the urge to generalize whenever it is possible to 
do so, we adhere firmly to an experimental appreciation of the natural 
world. Only when it seems unavoidable will we then tentatively 
postulate modest rules about the coordination and regularity we 
observe among these cases, subject always to confirmation or 
refutation by future experiences. 
So Bacon as the founder of empiricism guessed that all 
knowledge is based on experience derived from the senses and that 
the mind is not furnished with a set of concepts in advance of 
experience. 
Other famous English political philosopher Thomas Hobbes 
(1588–1679) was acquainted with both Bacon and Galileo. With the 
first he shared a strong concern for philosophical method, with the 
second an overwhelming interest in matter in motion. 
For Hobbes, that conception is bound to be a mechanistic one: 
the movements of physical objects will turn out to be sufficient to 
explain everything in the universe. The chief purpose of scientific 
investigation, then, is to develop a geometrical account of the motion 
of bodies, which will reveal the genuine basis of their causal 
interactions and the regularity of the natural world. Thus, Hobbes 
defended a strictly materialist view of the world. 
Human Nature 
Human beings are physical objects, according to Hobbes, 
sophisticated machines all of whose functions and activities can be 
described and explained in purely mechanistic terms. Even thought 
itself, therefore, must be understood as an instance of the physical 
operation of the human body. Sensation, for example, involves a 
series of mechanical processes operating within the human nervous 
system, by means of which the sensible features of material things 
produce ideas in the brains of the human beings who perceive them 
(‘Leviathan’; I, 1). 
Human action is similarly to be explained on Hobbes’s view. 
Specific desires and appetites arise in the human body and are 
experienced as discomforts or pains which must be overcome. Thus, 
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each of us is motivated to act in such ways as we believe likely to 
relieve our discomfort, to preserve and promote our own well-being. 
(‘Leviathan’; I, 6). Everything we choose to do is strictly determined 
by this natural inclination to relieve the physical pressures that 
impinge upon our bodies. Human volition is nothing but the 
determination of the will by the strongest present desire.  
Hobbes nevertheless supposed that human agents are free in 
the sense that their activities are not under constraint from anyone 
else. On this compatibilist view, we have no reason to complain 
about the strict determination of the will so long as we are not subject 
to interference from outside ourselves (‘Leviathan’; II, 21). 
As Hobbes acknowledged, this account of human nature 
emphasizes our animal nature, leaving each of us to live 
independently of everyone else, acting only in his or her own self-
interest, without regard for others. This produces what he called the 
‘state of war’, a way of life that is certain to prove ‘solitary, poor, 
nasty, brutish and short’ (‘Leviathan’; I, 13). The only escape is by 
entering into contracts with each other mutually beneficial 
agreements to surrender our individual interests in order to achieve 
the advantages of security that only a social existence can provide 
(‘Leviathan’; I, 14). 
Concept of Reason 
Hobbes’s concept of reason has more in common with the 
classical philosophical tradition stemming from Plato and Aristotle, 
where reason sets the ends of behaviour, than with the modern 
tradition stemming from Hume where the only function of reason is 
to discover the best means to ends set by the passions. For Hobbes, 
reason is very complex; it has a goal, lasting self-preservation, and it 
seeks the way to this goal. It also discovers the means to ends set by 
the passions, but it governs the passions or tries to, so that its own 
goal is not threatened. Since its goal is the same in all people, it is the 
source of rules applying to all people. All of this is surprisingly close 
to the generally accepted account of rationality. We generally agree 
that those who follow their passions when they threaten their life are 
acting irrationally. We also believe that everyone always ought to act 
rationally, though we know that few always do so. Perhaps it was just 
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the closeness of Hobbes’s account of reason to the ordinary view of 
the matter that has led to its being so completely overlooked. 
The failure to recognize that the avoidance of violent death is 
the primary goal of reason has distorted almost all accounts of 
Hobbes’s moral and political philosophy, yet it is a point on which 
Hobbes is completely clear and consistent. 
He explicitly says that reason ‘teaches every man to fly a 
contra-natural dissolution as the greatest mischief that can arrive to 
nature’. He continually points out that it is a dictate of right reason to 
seek peace when possible because people cannot ‘expect any lasting 
preservation continuing thus in the state of nature, that is, of war’. 
And he calls temperance and fortitude precepts of reason because 
they tend to one’s preservation. 
It has not generally been recognized that Hobbes regarded it 
as an end of reason to avoid violent death because he often talks of 
the avoidance of death in a way that makes it seem merely an object 
of a passion. But it is reason that dictates that one take all those 
measures necessary for one’s preservation; peace if possible, if not, 
defense. Reason’s dictates are categorical; it would be a travesty of 
Hobbes’s view to regard the dictates of reason as hypothetical 
judgments addressed to those whose desire for their own preservation 
happens to be greater than any conflicting desire. He explicitly 
deplores the power of the irrational appetites and expressly declares 
that it is a dictate of reason that one not scorn others because ‘most 
men would rather lose their lives (that I say not, their peace) than 
suffer slander’. He does not say if you would rather die than suffer 
slander, it is rational to do so. 
Human Society 
Hobbes is one of the few philosophers to realize that to talk of 
that part of human nature which involves the passions is to talk about 
human populations. He says, ‘though the wicked were fewer than the 
righteous, yet because we cannot distinguish them, there is a 
necessity of suspecting, heeding, anticipating, subjugating, self-
defending, ever incident to the most honest and fairest conditioned’. 
Though we may be aware of small communities in which mutual 
trust and respect make law enforcement unnecessary, this is never the 
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case when we are dealing with a large group of people. Hobbes’s 
point is that if a large group of people are to live together, there must 
be a common power set up to enforce the rules of the society. That 
there is not now, nor has there ever been, any large group of people 
living together without such a common power is sufficient to 
establish his point. 
Often overlooked is Hobbes’s distinction between people 
considered as if they were simply animals, not modified in any way 
by education or discipline, and civilized people. Though obviously an 
abstraction, people as animals are fairly well exemplified by children. 
‘Unless you give children all they ask for, they are peevish and cry, 
aye and strike their parents sometimes; and all this they have from 
nature’. In the state of nature, people have no education or training, 
so there is ‘continual fear, and danger of violent death, and the life of 
man, [is] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’. But real people 
have been brought up in families; they are, at least to some degree, 
civilized persons, and how they will behave depends on how they are 
brought up. Hobbes does not say that society is a collection of misfits 
and that this is why we have all the trouble that we do – a position 
congenial to the psychological egoist. But he does acknowledge that 
‘many also (perhaps most men) either through defect of mind, or 
want of education, remain unfit during the whole course of their 
lives; yet have they, infants as well as those of riper years, a human 
nature; wherefore man is made fit for society not by nature, but by 
education’. Education and training may change people so that they 
act out of genuine moral motives. That is why it is one of the most 
important functions of the sovereign to provide for the proper 
training and education of the citizens. In the current debate between 
nature and nurture, on the question of behaviour Hobbes would come 
down strongly on the side of nurture. 
People, insofar as they are rational, want to live out their 
natural lives in peace and security. To do this, they must come 
together into cities or states of sufficient size to deter attack by any 
group. But when people come together in such a large group there 
will always be some that cannot be trusted, and thus it is necessary to 
set up a government with the power to make and enforce laws. This 
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government, which gets both its right to govern and its power to do 
so from the consent of the governed, has as its primary duty the 
people’s safety. As long as the government provides this safety the 
citizens are obliged to obey the laws of the state in all things. Thus, 
the rationality of seeking lasting preservation requires seeking peace; 
this in turn requires setting up a state with sufficient power to keep 
the peace. Anything that threatens the stability of the state is to be 
avoided. 
Attitude to Religion 
As a practical matter, Hobbes took God and religion very 
seriously, for he thought they provided some of the strongest motives 
for action. Half of ‘Leviathan’ is devoted to trying to show that his 
moral and political views are supported by Scripture, and to discredit 
those religious views that may lead to civil strife. But accepting the 
sincerity of Hobbes’s religious views does not require holding that 
Hobbes regarded God as the foundation of morality. He explicitly 
denies that atheists and deists are subject to the commands of God, 
but he never denies that they are subject to the laws of nature or of 
the civil state. Once one recognizes that, for Hobbes, reason itself 
provides a guide to conduct to be followed by all people, there is 
absolutely no need to bring in God. For in his moral and political 
theory there is nothing that God can do that is not already done by 
reason. 
Other English philosopher John Locke (1632–1704) tried to 
apply Baconian methods to the pursuit of his own philosophical aims. 
In order to discover how the human understanding achieves 
knowledge, we must trace that knowledge to its origins in our 
experience. 
The Self 
Locke’s theory of mind is often cited as the origin of modern 
conceptions of identity and the self, figuring prominently in the work 
of later philosophers such as Hume, Rousseau and Kant. Locke was 
the first to define the self through a continuity of consciousness. He 
postulated that the mind was a blank slate – tabula rasa or empty 
cabinet. Contrary to pre-existing Cartesian philosophy, he 
maintained that we are born without innate ideas, and that knowledge 
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is instead determined only by experience derived from sense 
perception. 
Political Theory 
Locke’s political theory was founded on social contract 
theory. Unlike Thomas Hobbes, Locke believed that human nature is 
characterized by reason and tolerance. Like Hobbes, Locke believed 
that human nature allowed men to be selfish. This is apparent with 
the introduction of currency. In a natural state all people were equal 
and independent, and everyone had a natural right to defend his ‘Life, 
health, Liberty or Possessions’, basis for the phrase in the American 
Declaration of Independence; ‘Life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness’ (‘Two Treatises of Government’). 
Like Hobbes, Locke assumed that the sole right to defend in 
the state of nature was not enough, so people established a civil 
society to resolve conflicts in a civil way with help from government 
in a state of society. Locke also advocated governmental separation 
of powers and believed that revolution is not only a right but an 
obligation in some circumstances. These ideas would come to have 
profound influence on the Constitution of the United States and its 
Declaration of Independence. 
Perhaps the most important figure in the intellectual 
revolution of the seventeenth century in which the traditional systems 
of understanding based on Aristotle were challenged and, ultimately, 
overthrown was French philosopher and mathematician René 
Descartes (1596–1650). 
The Cartesian System 
In a celebrated simile, Descartes described the whole of 
philosophy as like a tree: the roots are metaphysics, the trunk physics 
and the branches are the various particular sciences, including 
mechanics, medicine and morals. The analogy captures at least three 
important features of the Cartesian system. The first is its insistence 
on the essential unity of knowledge, which contrasts strongly with the 
Aristotelian conception of the sciences as a series of separate 
disciplines, each with its own methods and standards of precision. 
The sciences, as Descartes put it in an early notebook, are all ‘linked 
together’ in a sequence that is in principle as simple and 
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straightforward as the series of numbers. The second point conveyed 
by the tree simile is the utility of philosophy for ordinary living: the 
tree is valued for its fruits, and these are gathered, Descartes points 
out, ‘not from the roots or the trunk but from the ends of the 
branches’ – the practical sciences. Descartes frequently stresses that 
his principal motivation is not abstract theorizing for its own sake: in 
place of the ‘speculative philosophy taught in the Schools’, we can 
and should achieve knowledge that is ‘useful in life’ and that will one 
day make us ‘masters and possessors of nature’. Third, the likening 
of metaphysics or ‘first philosophy’ to the roots of the tree nicely 
captures the Cartesian belief in what has come to be known as 
foundationalism – the view that knowledge must be constructed from 
the bottom up, and that nothing can be taken as established until we 
have gone back to first principles. 
The Method of Deduction 
The main similarly productive method of Descartes’ 
philosophy is deduction – the inference of particular instances by 
reference to a general law or principle. His deduction characterized 
by four simple rules: 
1. Accept as true only what is indubitable. 
2. Divide every question into manageable parts. 
3. Begin with the simplest issues and ascend to the more 
complex. 
4. Review frequently enough to retain the whole argument at 
once. 
The Method of Doubt and Foundations of Belief 
In his ‘Discourse on the Method’, Descartes attempts to arrive 
at a fundamental set of principles that one can know as true without 
any doubt. To achieve this, he employs a method called 
hyperbolical/metaphysical doubt, also sometimes referred to as 
methodological skepticism: he rejects any ideas that can be doubted, 
and then reestablishes them in order to acquire a firm foundation for 
genuine knowledge. The basic strategy of Descartes’s method of 
doubt is to defeat skepticism on its own ground. Begin by doubting 
the truth of everything – not only the evidence of the senses and the 
more extravagant cultural presuppositions, but even the fundamental 
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process of reasoning itself. If any particular truth about the world can 
survive this extreme skeptical challenge, then it must be truly 
indubitable and therefore a perfectly certain foundation for 
knowledge. The First Meditation, then, is an extended exercise in 
learning to doubt everything that I believe, considered at three 
distinct levels: 
1. Perceptual Illusion 
First, Descartes noted that the testimony of the senses with 
respect to any particular judgment about the external world may turn 
out to be mistaken. Things are not always just as they seem at first 
glance (or at first hearing, etc.) to be. But then, Descartes argues, it is 
prudent never wholly to trust in the truth of what we perceive. In 
ordinary life, of course, we adjust for mistaken perceptions by 
reference to correct perceptions. But since we cannot be sure at first 
which cases are veridical and which are not, it is possible (if not 
always feasible) to doubt any particular bit of apparent sensory 
knowledge. 
2. The Dream Problem 
Second, Descartes raised a more systematic method for 
doubting the legitimacy of all sensory perception. Since my most 
vivid dreams are internally indistinguishable from waking 
experience, he argued, it is possible that everything I now ‘perceive’ 
to be part of the physical world outside me is in fact nothing more 
than a fanciful fabrication of my own imagination. On this 
supposition, it is possible to doubt that any physical thing really 
exists, that there is an external world at all. 
Severe as it is, this level of doubt is not utterly 
comprehensive, since the truths of mathematics and the content of 
simple natures remain unaffected. Even if there is no material world 
(and thus, even in my dreams) two plus three makes five and red 
looks red to me. In order to doubt the veracity of such fundamental 
beliefs, I must extend the method of doubting even more 
hyperbolically. 
3. A Deceiving God 
Finally, then, Descartes raises even more comprehensive 
doubts by inviting us to consider a radical hypothesis derived from 
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one of our most treasured traditional beliefs. What if (as religion 
teaches) there is an omnipotent God, but that deity devotes its full 
attention to deceiving me? The problem here is not merely that I 
might be forced by God to believe what something which is in fact 
false. Descartes means to raise the far more devastating possibility 
that whenever I believe anything, even if it has always been true up 
until now, a truly omnipotent deceiver could at that very moment 
choose to change the world so as to render my belief false. On this 
supposition, it seems possible to doubt the truth of absolutely 
anything I might come to believe. 
Do I exist? 
Descartes arrives at only a single principle: thought exists. 
Thought cannot be separated from me, therefore, I exist (‘Discourse 
on the Method and Principles of Philosophy’). Most famously, this is 
known as cogito ergo sum (English: ‘I think, therefore I am’). 
Therefore, Descartes concluded, if he doubted, then something or 
someone must be doing the doubting, therefore the very fact that he 
doubted proved his existence. ‘The simple meaning of the phrase is 
that if one is skeptical of existence, that is in and of itself proof that 
he does exist’. 
Dualism 
Descartes in his ‘Passions of the Soul’ and ‘The Description 
of the Human Body’ suggested that the body works like a machine, 
that it has the material properties of extension and motion, and that it 
follows the laws of physics. The mind (or soul), on the other hand, 
was described as a nonmaterial entity that lacks extension and 
motion, and does not follow the laws of physics. Descartes argued 
that only humans have minds, and that the mind interacts with the 
body at the pineal gland. This form of dualism or duality proposes 
that the mind controls the body, but that the body can also influence 
the otherwise rational mind, such as when people act out of passion. 
Most of the previous accounts of the relationship between mind and 
body had been unidirectional. 
Descartes suggested that the pineal gland is ‘the seat of the 
soul’ for several reasons. First, the soul is unitary, and unlike many 
areas of the brain the pineal gland appeared to be unitary (though 
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subsequent microscopic inspection has revealed it is formed of two 
hemispheres). Second, Descartes observed that the pineal gland was 
located near the ventricles. He believed the cerebrospinal fluid of the 
ventricles acted through the nerves to control the body, and that the 
pineal gland influenced this process. Finally, although Descartes 
realized that both humans and animals have pineal glands, he 
believed that only humans have minds. This led him to the belief that 
animals cannot feel pain. 
Descartes’ Epistemology: Innate Ideas 
Descartes argues that ideas may be either innate, adventitious 
or factitious. Innate ideas are ideas which are not dependent on our 
perceptions or on our own will. Innate ideas are inherently present in 
the reasoning of the mind. Adventitious ideas are ideas derived from 
our experience of the world. Factitious ideas are ideas which may be 
illusory or invented by the imagination. 
Descartes also argues that all innate ideas are clear and 
distinct concepts of reality. Adventitious or factitious ideas, however, 
may be unclear and indistinct. 
Descartes explains that an idea may be clear and distinct 
insofar as it sufficiently and accurately represents reality. An idea 
may be clear without being distinct. However, any idea which is 
distinct is also clear. 
In the ‘Fifth Meditation’, Descartes argues that the idea of 
God, as an infinite, eternal, all-knowing, all-powerful Being, is an 
innate idea which has more objective reality than the ideas by which 
finite substances are represented in the mind. 
In the ‘Sixth Meditation’, having asserted that innate ideas or 
self-evident truths can be known by reason, Descartes describes how 
we can know that material things exist in the physical world. God can 
produce everything in the world exactly as we perceive it. When we 
have clear and distinct ideas about the world, we can know true 
reality. 
Descartes explains that if we agree that God exists and that all 
things depend on God, then we can no longer doubt that we can have 
true and certain knowledge of material things. Knowledge of the truth 
 16 
of things may depend on knowledge of God. The more that we know 
God, the more that we may know the truth of things. 
The Idea of God 
In the ‘Third Meditation’, Descartes offers a proof for the 
existence of God, arguing that the idea of God as Infinite Being could 
not occur in the finite mind of a human being unless God really 
existed. The idea of God as Infinite Being is an innate idea in the 
human mind, an idea which cannot be created by any finite being. 
This perfect idea can only be created by God. 
Descartes argues that in God perfection is actually existent, 
rather than potentially existent. The idea of God cannot be caused by 
something which is merely potentially existent, but only by an 
actually existing reality. 
Descartes also argues that God is Absolute Being. 
Nothingness is Non-Being. Reality depends for its being on God. 
Truth is the degree to which an idea corresponds to reality. Error is 
the degree to which an idea does not correspond to reality. 
Descartes explains that in order to determine the truth of an 
idea, we must determine to what degree the idea corresponds to 
reality. Human susceptibility to error is caused by the fact that we, as 
human beings, do not have an unlimited ability to recognize the truth, 
and by the fact that we are free to choose either truth or falsehood. 
According to Descartes, God is perfect and is not the cause of 
any error. When we think of God, we find no cause of error or 
falsehood. The reason why we doubt the truth is that we are 
incomplete in our ability to recognize the truth. We depend for our 
existence on God, who is complete and independent. 
In the ‘Fifth Meditation’, Descartes gives another proof of the 
existence of God. Descartes argues that existence cannot be separated 
from the essence of God. ‘I cannot think of God as not actually 
existing... I cannot think of God other than as existing... I cannot say 
that God does not exist if I am thinking about God’. God has all 
perfections, including the idea of every perfection. Perfection of 
existence is found in God. Thus, ‘I can be certain of the knowledge 
that God exists, because existence is a perfection that belongs to 
God’. 
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Two philosophers of genius carried on the tradition of 
continental rationalism: the Dutch Benedict de Spinoza (1632–1677) 
and his younger contemporary Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–
1716). 
Spinoza borrowed much of the basic apparatus of Descartes: 
aim at rational understanding of principles, terminology of 
‘substance’ and of ‘clear and distinct ideas’, and mathematical 
method that seeks to convert philosophical knowledge into a 
complete deductive system. 
Metaphysics 
Spinoza often uses the term ‘God or Nature’, and this 
identification of God with Nature is at the heart of his metaphysics. 
Because of this identification, his philosophy is often regarded as a 
version of pantheism and/or naturalism. But although philosophy 
begins with metaphysics for Spinoza, his metaphysics is ultimately in 
the service of his ethics. Because his naturalized God has no desires 
or purposes, human ethics cannot properly be derived from divine 
command. Rather, Spinozistic ethics seeks to demonstrate, from an 
adequate understanding of the divine nature and its expression in 
human nature, the way in which human beings can maximize their 
advantage. Central to the successful pursuit of this advantage is 
adequate knowledge, which leads to increasing control of the 
passions and to cooperative action. 
Spinoza’s ontology, like that of Descartes, consists of 
substances, their attributes (which Descartes called ‘principal 
attributes’) and their modes. In the ‘Ethics’, Spinoza defines 
‘substance’ as what is ‘in itself, and is conceived through itself’; 
‘attribute’ as that which ‘the intellect perceives of a substance as 
constituting its essence’; and ‘mode’ as ‘the affections of a substance 
or that which is in another through which also it is conceived’. While 
Descartes had recognized a strict sense in which only God is a 
substance, he also recognized a second sense in which there are two 
kinds of created substances, each with its own principal attribute: 
extended substances, whose only principal attribute is extension; and 
minds, whose only principal attribute is thought. Spinoza, in contrast, 
consistently maintains that there is only one substance. His 
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metaphysics is thus a form of substantial monism. This one 
substance is God, which Spinoza defines as ‘a being absolutely 
infinite, i.e., a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, of 
which each expresses an eternal and infinite essence’. Thus, whereas 
Descartes limited each created substance to one principal attribute, 
Spinoza claims that the one substance has infinite attributes, each 
expressing the divine nature without limitation in its own way. Of 
these infinite attributes, however, humans can comprehend only two: 
extension and thought. Within each attribute, the modes of God are of 
two kinds: infinite modes, which are pervasive features of each 
attribute, such as the laws of nature; and finite modes, which are local 
and limited modifications of substance. There is an infinite sequence 
of finite modes. 
Descartes regarded a human being as a substantial union of 
two different substances, the thinking soul and the extended body, in 
causal interaction with each other. Spinoza, in contrast, regards a 
human being as a finite mode of God, existing simultaneously in God 
as a mode of thought and as a mode of extension. He holds that every 
mode of extension is literally identical with the mode of thought that 
is the ‘idea of’ that mode of extension. Since the human mind is the 
idea of the human body, it follows that the human mind and the 
human body are literally the same thing, conceived under two 
different attributes. Because they are actually identical, there is no 
causal interaction between the mind and the body; but there is a 
complete parallelism between what occurs in the mind and what 
occurs in the body. Since every mode of extension has a 
corresponding and identical mode of thought (however rudimentary 
that might be), Spinoza allows that every mode of extension is 
‘animated to some degree’; his view is thus a form of panpsychism 
(the doctrine or belief that everything material, however small, has an 
element of individual consciousness). 
Determinism 
Another central feature of Spinoza’s metaphysics is his 
necessitarianism, expressed in his claim that ‘things could have been 
produced ... in no other way, and in no other order’ than that in which 
they have been produced. He derives this necessitarianism from his 
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doctrine that God exists necessarily (for which he offers several 
arguments, including a version of the ontological argument) and his 
doctrine that everything that can follow from the divine nature must 
necessarily do so. Thus, although he does not use the term, he accepts 
a very strong version of the principle of sufficient reason. At the 
outset of the ‘Ethics’, he defines a thing as free when its actions are 
determined by its own nature alone. Only God – whose actions are 
determined entirely by the necessity of his own nature, and for whom 
nothing is external – is completely free in this sense. Nevertheless, 
human beings can achieve a relative freedom to the extent that they 
live the kind of life described in the later parts of the ‘Ethics’. Hence, 
Spinoza is a compatibilist concerning the relation between freedom 
and determinism. ‘Freedom of the will’ in any sense that implies a 
lack of causal determination, however, is simply an illusion based on 
ignorance of the true causes of a being’s actions. The recognition that 
all occurrences are causally determined, Spinoza holds, has a positive 
consolatory power that aids one in controlling the passions. So 
genuine freedom comes only with knowledge of what it is that 
necessitates our actions. Recognizing the invariable influence of 
desire over our passionate natures, we then strive for the peace of 
mind that comes through an impartial attachment to reason. Although 
such an attitude is not easy to maintain, Spinoza concluded that ‘All 
noble things are as difficult as they are rare’. 
Ethics and Epistemology 
Spinoza held good and evil to be relative concepts, claiming 
that nothing is intrinsically good or bad except relative to a particular 
individual. Things that had classically been seen as good or evil, 
Spinoza argued, were simply good or bad for humans. In the universe 
anything that happens comes from the essential nature of objects or 
of God/Nature. According to Spinoza, reality is perfection. If 
circumstances are seen as unfortunate it is only because of our 
inadequate conception of reality and the world as it exists looks 
imperfect only because of our limited perception. 
Leibniz’s contributions to philosophy were known to his 
contemporaries through doctrine named pluralism – a theory that 
recognizes a few ultimate principles or substances (as opposed to the 
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dualism of Descartes’s thought and extension and the monism of 
Spinoza’s single substance, which is God). There were for him an 
infinite number of spiritual substances (which he called ‘monads’), 
each different, each a percipient of the universe around it and each 
mirroring that universe from its own point of view. Monads are the 
ultimate elements of the universe. The monads are ‘substantial forms 
of being’ with the following properties: they are eternal, 
indecomposable, individual, subject to their own laws, un-interacting 
and each reflecting the entire universe in a pre-established harmony 
(a historically important example of panpsychism). Monads are 
centres of force; substance is force, while space, matter and motion 
are merely phenomenal. 
The ontological essence of a monad is its irreducible 
simplicity. Unlike atoms, monads possess no material or spatial 
character. They also differ from atoms by their complete mutual 
independence, so that interactions among monads are only apparent. 
Instead, by virtue of the principle of pre-established harmony, each 
monad follows a preprogrammed set of ‘instructions’ peculiar to 
itself, so that a monad ‘knows’ what to do at each moment. (These 
‘instructions’ may be seen as analogs of the scientific laws governing 
subatomic particles). By virtue of these intrinsic instructions, each 
monad is like a little mirror of the universe. Monads need not be 
‘small’; e.g., each human being constitutes a monad, in which case 
free will is problematic. God, too, is a monad, and the existence of 
God can be inferred from the harmony prevailing among all other 
monads; God wills the pre-established harmony. 
 
Checklist 
 
1. Identify the main features of the Age of Reason philosophy? What 
do they caused? 
2. Name the most outstanding empiric philosophy representatives of 
the XVII–XVIII centuries and characterize their doctrines. 
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3. Describe the main ideas and representatives of rationalism of the 
Age of Reason philosophy. 
4. Write a philosophical essay “The scientific methods of Rene 
Descartes and Francis Bacon”. 
 
 
 
Topic 2. CLASSICAL GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 
 
1. The theory of cognition and ethics of Immanuel Kant. 
2. Georg Hegel’s philosophical system and method. The main 
principles of his dialectical logic. 
3. Materialism and dialectics in the K. Marx and F. Engels 
philosophy. Materialistic understanding of history in sociology of 
Marxism. Theory of alienation. 
 
The basic concepts and categories: ‘Copernican revolution’, 
activity concept, object, subject, a priori, a posteriori, analytic and 
synthetic judgments, phenomenon and noumenon, ‘thing-in-itself’, 
transcendental ideas, apperception, antinomy, categorical imperative 
(the moral order), dialectics, dialectical logic, absolute idea, triad, 
thesis, antithesis, synthesis, progress, contradictions, negation of the 
negation, quantity, quality, measure, atheism, alienation, social and 
economic structure, social class, capital, proletariat, communism, 
socialism, capitalism, productive tools and resources, productive 
relations, basis and superstructure, private property, revolution. 
 
Methodological Recommendations on Seminar 
Employments Conducting 
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) was the last influential 18th-
century German philosopher of modern Europe in the classic 
sequence of the theory of knowledge. He created a new perspective 
in philosophy which had widespread influences on philosophy 
continuing through to the 21st century. He published important works 
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on epistemology, as well as works relevant to religion, law and 
history. One of his most prominent works is the ‘Critique of Pure 
Reason’, an investigation into the limitations and structure of reason 
itself. It encompasses an attack on traditional metaphysics and 
epistemology, and highlights Kant’s own contribution to these areas. 
The other main works of his maturity are the ‘Critique of Practical 
Reason’, which concentrates on ethics and the ‘Critique of 
Judgment’, which investigates aesthetics and teleology. 
Kant’s Copernican Revolution: Mind Making Nature 
We can understand Kant’s argument by considering his 
predecessors. According to the rationalist and empiricist traditions, 
the mind is passive either because it finds itself possessing innate, 
well-formed ideas ready for analysis, or because it receives ideas of 
objects into a kind of empty theatre or blank slate. Kant’s crucial 
insight here is to argue that experience of a world as we have it is 
only possible if the mind provides a systematic structuring of its 
representations. He supposed that the only adequate response would 
be a ‘Copernican revolution’ in philosophy, a recognition that the 
appearance of the external world depends in some measure upon the 
position and movement of its observers. So the conditions and 
qualities he ascribed to the subject of knowledge placed man at the 
centre of all conceptual and empirical experience, and overcame the 
rationalism-empiricism impasse, characteristic of the 17th and 18th 
centuries. 
Varieties of Judgment 
In the ‘Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysic’ (1783) Kant 
presented the central themes of the first ‘Critique’ in a somewhat 
different manner, starting from instances in which we do appear to 
have achieved knowledge and asking under what conditions each 
case becomes possible. So he began by carefully drawing a pair of 
crucial distinctions among the judgments we do actually make. 
The first distinction separates a priori from a posteriori 
judgments by reference to the origin of our knowledge of them. A 
priori judgments are based upon reason alone, independently of all 
sensory experience, and therefore apply with strict universality. A 
posteriori judgments, on the other hand, must be grounded upon 
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experience and are consequently limited and uncertain in their 
application to specific cases. Thus, this distinction also marks the 
difference traditionally noted in logic between necessary and 
contingent truths. 
But Kant also made a less familiar distinction between 
analytic and synthetic judgments, according to the information 
conveyed as their content. Analytic judgments are those whose 
predicates are wholly contained in their subjects; since they add 
nothing to our concept of the subject, such judgments are purely 
explicative and can be deduced from the principle of non-
contradiction. Synthetic judgments, on the other hand, are those 
whose predicates are wholly distinct from their subjects, to which 
they must be shown to relate because of some real connection 
external to the concepts themselves. Hence, synthetic judgments are 
genuinely informative but require justification by reference to some 
outside principle. 
Kant supposed that previous philosophers had failed to 
differentiate properly between these two distinctions. Both Leibniz 
and Hume had made just one distinction, between matters of fact 
based on sensory experience and the uninformative truths of pure 
reason. In fact, Kant held, the two distinctions are not entirely 
coextensive; we need at least to consider all four of their logically 
possible combinations: 
Analytic a posteriori judgments cannot arise, since there is 
never any need to appeal to experience in support of a purely 
explicative assertion. 
Synthetic a posteriori judgments are the relatively 
uncontroversial matters of fact we come to know by means of our 
sensory experience (though Wolff had tried to derive even these from 
the principle of contradiction). 
Analytic a priori judgments, everyone agrees, include all 
merely logical truths and straightforward matters of definition; they 
are necessarily true. 
Synthetic a priori judgments are the crucial case, since only 
they could provide new information that is necessarily true. But 
neither Leibniz nor Hume considered the possibility of any such case. 
 24 
Unlike his predecessors, Kant maintained that synthetic a 
priori judgments not only are possible but actually provide the basis 
for significant portions of human knowledge. In fact, he supposed 
(pace Hume) that arithmetic and geometry comprise such judgments 
and that natural science depends on them for its power to explain and 
predict events. What is more, metaphysics – if it turns out to be 
possible at all – must rest upon synthetic a priori judgments, since 
anything else would be either uninformative or unjustifiable. But how 
are synthetic a priori judgments possible at all? This is the central 
question Kant sought to answer. 
Phenomena and Noumena 
Having seen Kant’s transcendental deduction of the categories 
as pure concepts of the understanding applicable a priori to every 
possible experience, we might naturally wish to ask the further 
question whether these regulative principles are really true. Are there 
substances? Does every event have a cause? Do all things interact? 
Given that we must suppose them in order to have any experience, do 
they obtain in the world itself? To these further questions, Kant 
firmly refused to offer any answer. 
According to Kant, it is vital always to distinguish between 
the distinct realms of phenomena and noumena. Phenomena are the 
appearances, which constitute the our experience; noumena are the 
(presumed) things themselves, which constitute reality. All of our 
synthetic a priori judgments apply only to the phenomenal realm, not 
the noumenal. (It is only at this level, with respect to what we can 
experience, that we are justified in imposing the structure of our 
concepts onto the objects of our knowledge). Since the thing in itself 
would by definition (as an actual object, which properties 
independent of any observer) be entirely independent of our 
experience of it, we are utterly ignorant of the noumenal realm. 
Thus, on Kant’s view, the most fundamental laws of nature, 
like the truths of mathematics are knowable precisely because they 
make no effort to describe the world as it really is but rather prescribe 
the structure of the world as we experience it. By applying the pure 
forms of sensible intuition and the pure concepts of the 
understanding, we achieve a systematic view of the phenomenal 
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realm but learn nothing of the noumenal realm. Math and science are 
certainly true of the phenomena; only metaphysics claims to instruct 
us about the noumena. 
Transcendental Ideas 
Kant’s exposition of the transcendental ideas begins once 
again from the logical distinction among categorical, hypothetical 
and disjunctive syllogisms. From this distinction, as we have seen, 
the understanding derives the concepts of substance, cause and 
community, which provide the basis for rules that obtain as natural 
laws within our experience. Now, from the same distinction, the 
reason must carry things further in order derive the transcendental 
ideas of the complete subject, the complete series of conditions, and 
the complete complex of what is possible. Thus, the ‘completion’ of 
metaphysical reasoning requires transcendental ideas of three sorts, 
but Kant argued that each leads to its characteristic irresolvable 
difficulty. 
The Psychological Idea is the concept of the soul as a 
permanent substance which lives forever. It is entirely natural to 
reason (as in Descartes’s cogito) from knowledge that ‘I think’ to my 
real existence as one and the same thinking thing through all time, 
but Kant held that our efforts to reach such conclusions are 
‘Paralogisms’, with only illusory validity. It is true that thought 
presupposes the unity of apperception and that every change 
presupposes an underlying substance, but these rules apply only to 
the phenomena we experience. Since substantial unity and 
immortality are supposed to be noumenal features of the soul as a 
thing in itself, Kant held, legitimate a priori judgments can never 
prove them and the effort to transcend in this case fails. 
The Cosmological Idea is the concept of a complete 
determination of the nature of the world as it must be constituted in 
itself. In this case, Kant held, the difficulty is not that we can 
conclude too little but rather that we can prove too much. From the 
structure of our experience of the world, it is easy to deduce 
contradictory particular claims about reality: finitude vs. infinity; 
simplicity vs. complexity; freedom vs. determinism; necessity vs. 
contingency. These ‘antinomies’ of Pure Reason can be avoided 
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only when we recognize that one or both of the contradictory proofs 
in each antinomy holds only for the phenomenal realm (antinomy is a 
contradiction between two beliefs or conclusions that are in 
themselves reasonable). Once again, it is the effort to achieve 
transcendental knowledge of noumena that necessarily fails. 
The Theological Idea is the concept of an absolutely perfect 
and most real being (or god). Again it is natural to move from our 
recognition of dependence within the phenomenal realm to the notion 
of a perfectly independent noumenal being, the ‘Transcendental 
Ideal’. But traditional attempts to prove that god really exists, 
founded as they are on what we experience, cannot establish the 
reality of a being necessarily beyond all experience. 
The general point of the transcendental dialectic should by 
now be clear: metaphysical speculation about the ultimate nature of 
reality invariably fails. The synthetic a priori judgments which 
properly serve as regulative principles governing our experience can 
never be shown to have any force as constitutive of the real nature of 
the world. Pure reason inevitably reaches for what it cannot grasp. 
The Limits of Reason 
Now that we’ve seen Kant’s answers to all three parts of the 
‘Prolegomena’s’ ‘Main Transcendental Question’ and have traced 
their sources in the ‘Critique of Pure Reason’, we are in a position to 
appreciate his careful delineation of what is possible in metaphysical 
thought and what is not. 
What most clearly is not possible is any legitimate synthetic a 
priori judgment about things in themselves. The only thing that 
justifies the application of regulative principles in mathematics and 
natural science is their limitation to phenomena. Both sensible 
intuition and understanding deal with the conditions under which 
experience is possible. But the whole point of speculative 
metaphysics is to transcend experience entirely in order to achieve 
knowledge of the noumenal realm. Here, only the faculty of reason is 
relevant, but its most crucial speculative conclusions, its deepest 
convictions about the self, the world and god are all drawn 
illegitimately. 
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What is possible – indeed, according to Kant what we are 
bound by our very nature as rational beings to do – is to think of the 
noumenal realm as if the speculative principles were true (whether or 
not they are). By the nature of reason itself, we are required to 
suppose our own existence as substantial beings, the possibility of 
our free action in a world of causal regularity and the existence of 
god. The absence of any formal justification for these notions makes 
it impossible for us to claim that we know them to be true, but it can 
in no way diminish the depth for our belief that they are. 
According to Kant, then, the rational human faculties lead us 
to the very boundaries of what can be known, by clarifying the 
conditions under which experience of the world as we know it is 
possible. But beyond those boundaries our faculties are useless. The 
shape of the boundary itself, as evidenced in the Paralogisms and 
antinomies naturally impels us to postulate that the unknown does 
indeed have certain features, but these further speculations are 
inherently unjustifiable. 
The only legitimate, ‘scientific’ metaphysics that the future 
may hold, Kant therefore held, would be a thoroughly critical, non-
speculative examination of the bounds of pure reason, a careful 
description of what we can know accompanied by a clear recognition 
that our transcendental concepts (however useful they may seem) are 
entirely unreliable as guides to the nature of reality. It is this task, of 
course, that Kant himself had pursued in the First ‘Critique’. 
Ethics: 
1. Reason and Freedom 
For Kant, as we have seen, the drive for total, systematic 
knowledge in reason can only be fulfilled with assumptions that 
empirical observation cannot support. The metaphysical facts about 
the ultimate nature of things in themselves must remain a mystery to 
us because of the spatiotemporal constraints on sensibility. When we 
think about the nature of things in themselves or the ultimate ground 
of the empirical world, Kant has argued that we are still constrained 
to think through the categories, we cannot think otherwise, but we 
can have no knowledge because sensation provides our concepts with 
no content. So, reason is put at odds with itself because it is 
 28 
constrained by the limits of its transcendental structure, but it seeks to 
have complete knowledge that would take it beyond those limits. 
Freedom plays a central role in Kant’s ethics because the 
possibility of moral judgments presupposes it. Freedom is an idea of 
reason that serves an indispensable practical function. Without the 
assumption of freedom, reason cannot act. If we think of ourselves as 
completely causally determined, and not as uncaused causes 
ourselves, then any attempt to conceive of a rule that prescribes the 
means by which some end can be achieved is pointless. I cannot both 
think of myself as entirely subject to causal law and as being able to 
act according to the conception of a principle that gives guidance to 
my will. We cannot help but think of our actions as the result of an 
uncaused cause if we are to act at all and employ reason to 
accomplish ends and understand the world. 
So reason has an unavoidable interest in thinking of itself as 
free. That is, theoretical reason cannot demonstrate freedom, but 
practical reason must assume for the purpose of action. Having the 
ability to make judgments and apply reason puts us outside that 
system of causally necessitated events. ‘Reason creates for itself the 
idea of a spontaneity that can, on its own, start to act – without, i.e., 
needing to be preceded by another cause by means of which it is 
determined to action in turn, according to the law of causal 
connection’, Kant says. In its intellectual domain, reason must think 
of itself as free. 
It is dissatisfying that he cannot demonstrate freedom, 
nevertheless, it comes as no surprise that we must think of ourselves 
as free. In a sense, Kant is agreeing with the common sense view that 
how I choose to act makes a difference in how I actually act. Even if 
it were possible to give a predictive empirical account of why I act as 
I do, say on the grounds of a functionalist psychological theory, those 
considerations would mean nothing to me in my deliberations. When 
I make a decision about what to do, about which car to buy, for 
instance, the mechanism at work in my nervous system makes no 
difference to me. I still have to peruse Consumer Reports, consider 
my options, reflect on my needs, and decide on the basis of the 
application of general principles. My first person perspective is 
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unavoidable, hence the deliberative, intellectual process of choice is 
unavoidable. 
2. The Good Will 
The will, Kant says, is the faculty of acting according to a 
conception of law. When we act, whether or not we achieve what we 
intend with our actions is often beyond our control, so the morality of 
our actions does not depend upon their outcome. What we can 
control, however, is the will behind the action. That is, we can will to 
act according to one law rather than another. The morality of an 
action, therefore, must be assessed in terms of the motivation behind 
it. If two people, Smith and Jones, perform the same act, from the 
same conception of the law, but events beyond Smith’s control 
prevent her from achieving her goal, Smith is not less praiseworthy 
for not succeeding. We must consider them on equal moral ground in 
terms of the will behind their actions. 
The only thing that is good without qualification is the good 
will, Kant says. All other candidates for an intrinsic good have 
problems, Kant argues. Courage, health and wealth can all be used 
for ill purposes, Kant argues, and therefore cannot be intrinsically 
good. Happiness is not intrinsically good because even being worthy 
of happiness, Kant says, requires that one possess a good will. The 
good will is the only unconditional good despite all encroachments. 
Misfortune may render someone incapable of achieving her goals, for 
instance, but the goodness of her will remains. 
Goodness cannot arise from acting on impulse or natural 
inclination, even if impulse coincides with duty. It can only arise 
from conceiving of one’s actions in a certain way. A shopkeeper, 
Kant says, might do what is in accord with duty and not overcharge a 
child. Kant argues, ‘it is not sufficient to do that which should be 
morally good that it conform to the law; it must be done for the sake 
of the law’. There is a clear moral difference between the shopkeeper 
that does it for his own advantage to keep from offending other 
customers and the shopkeeper who does it from duty and the 
principle of honesty. Likewise, in another of Kant’s carefully studied 
examples, the kind act of the person who overcomes a natural lack of 
sympathy for other people out of respect for duty has moral worth, 
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whereas the same kind act of the person who naturally takes pleasure 
in spreading joy does not. A person’s moral worth cannot be 
dependent upon what nature endowed them with accidentally. The 
selfishly motivated shopkeeper and the naturally kind person both act 
on equally subjective and accidental grounds. What matters to 
morality is that the actor think about their actions in the right manner. 
We might be tempted to think that the motivation that makes 
an action good is having a positive goal – to make people happy or to 
provide some benefit. But that is not the right sort of motive, Kant 
says. No outcome, should we achieve it, can be unconditionally good. 
Fortune can be misused, what we thought would induce benefit might 
actually bring harm and happiness might be undeserved. Hoping to 
achieve some particular end, no matter how beneficial it may seem, is 
not purely and unconditionally good. It is not the effect or even the 
intended effect that bestows moral character on an action. All 
intended effects ‘could be brought about through other causes and 
would not require the will of a rational being, while the highest and 
unconditional good can be found only in such a will’. It is the 
possession of a rationally guided will that adds a moral dimension to 
one’s acts. So it is the recognition and appreciation of duty itself that 
must drive our actions. 
3. Duty 
What is the duty that is to motivate our actions and to give 
them moral value? Kant distinguishes two kinds of law produced by 
reason. Given some end we wish to achieve, reason can provide a 
hypothetical imperative or rule of action for achieving that end. A 
hypothetical imperative says that if you wish to buy a new car, then 
you must determine what sort of cars are available for purchase. 
Conceiving of a means to achieve some desired end is by far the most 
common employment of reason. But Kant has shown that the 
acceptable conception of the moral law cannot be merely 
hypothetical. Our actions cannot be moral on the ground of some 
conditional purpose or goal. Morality requires an unconditional 
statement of one’s duty. 
And in fact, reason produces an absolute statement of moral 
action. The moral imperative is unconditional; that is, its imperative 
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force is not tempered by the conditional ‘if I want to achieve some 
end, then do X’. It simply states, do X. Kant believes that reason 
dictates a categorical imperative for moral action. He gives at least 
three formulations of the Categorical Imperative. 
1. ‘Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the 
same time will that it should become a universal law’. 
2. ‘Act as though the maxim of your action were by your will 
to become a universal law of nature’. 
3. Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person 
or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only’. 
What are Kant’s arguments for the categorical imperative? 
First, consider an example. Consider the person who needs to borrow 
money and is considering making a false promise to pay it back. The 
maxim that could be invoked is, ‘when I need of money, borrow it, 
promising to repay it, even though I do not intend to’. But when we 
apply the universality test to this maxim it becomes clear that if 
everyone were to act in this fashion, the institution of promising itself 
would be undermined. The borrower makes a promise, willing that 
there be no such thing as promises. Thus such an action fails the 
universality test. 
The argument for the first formulation of the categorical 
imperative can be thought of this way. We have seen that in order to 
be good, we must remove inclination and the consideration of any 
particular goal from our motivation to act. The act cannot be good if 
it arises from subjective impulse. Nor can it be good because it seeks 
after some particular goal which might not attain the good we seek or 
could come about through happenstance. We must abstract away 
from all hoped for effects. If we remove all subjectivity and 
particularity from motivation we are only left with will to 
universality. The question ‘what rule determines what I ought to do 
in this situation?’ becomes ‘what rule ought to universally guide 
action?’ What we must do in any situation of moral choice is act 
according to a maxim that we would will everyone to act according 
to. 
The second version of the Categorical Imperative invokes 
Kant’s conception of nature and draws on the first ‘Critique’. In the 
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earlier discussion of nature, we saw that the mind necessarily 
structures nature. And reason, in its seeking of ever higher grounds of 
explanation, strives to achieve unified knowledge of nature. A guide 
for us in moral matters is to think of what would not be possible to 
will universally. Maxims that fail the test of the categorical 
imperative generate a contradiction. Laws of nature cannot be 
contradictory. So if a maxim cannot be willed to be a law of nature, it 
is not moral. 
The third version of the categorical imperative ties Kant’s 
whole moral theory together. Insofar as they possess a rational will, 
people are set off in the natural order of things. They are not merely 
subject to the forces that act upon them; they are not merely means to 
ends. They are ends in themselves. All means to an end have a 
merely conditional worth because they are valuable only for 
achieving something else. The possessor of a rational will, however, 
is the only thing with unconditional worth. The possession of 
rationality puts all beings on the same footing, ‘every other rational 
being thinks of his existence by means of the same rational ground 
which holds also for myself; thus it is at the same time an objective 
principle from which, as a supreme practical ground, it must be 
possible to derive all laws of the will’. 
The greatest of all German idealists was Georg Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), who methodically constructed a 
comprehensive system of thought about the world. 
Absolute Idealism 
Focused like Kant on the goal of showing how some 
fundamental unity underlies the confusing multiplicity of experiential 
contents, Hegel took a much more systematic approach by making 
absolute consciousness the key source of ultimate connections among 
all other things. Above all else, Hegel held that reality must be 
rational, so that its ultimate structure is revealed in the structure of 
our thought. Everything that is thinkable, especially apparent 
contradictions, must be resolvable under some common concept of 
the reason. In what follows, we will examine in detail the logical 
apparatus Hegel employed in pursuit of knowledge. 
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Even more than Aristotle and the Stoics, Hegel believed that 
the study of logic is an investigation into the fundamental structure of 
reality itself. According to Hegel, all logic (and, hence, all of reality) 
is dialectical in character. As Kant had noted in the antinomies, 
serious thought about one general description of the world commonly 
leads us into a contemplation of its opposite. But Hegel did not 
suppose this to be the end of the matter; he made the further 
supposition that the two concepts so held in opposition can always be 
united by a shift to some higher level of thought. Thus, the human 
mind invariably moves from thesis to antithesis to synthesis, 
employing each synthesis as the thesis for a new opposition to be 
transcended by yet a higher level, continuing in a perpetual waltz of 
intellectual achievement.  
Being, for example, is a basic concept that serves as a clear 
starting-point for any serious thinker, but serious contemplation of its 
nature reveals it to be so utterly devoid of specific content that the 
mind is naturally led to the thought of Nothing as its opposite; but 
these two are not really contradictory, since both may be unified 
under the more sophisticated and comprehensive notion of 
Becoming. If, on the other hand, our thesis is the concept of Being as 
a naive immediate presentation of experience, then its natural 
antithesis is the idea of Essence as knowledge mediated by 
classification; and the synthesis that unites these concepts is that of 
the Notion as a self-mediating interpretation of thought and reality 
combined. 
On the grandest scale of conceivability, all of thought 
(including the dialectical logic itself) is comprised by the thesis Idea, 
whose natural antithesis is Nature, the otherness of the known 
considered independently of its relation to the knower; and the grand 
synthesis of the two is Spirit, the self-knowing, self-actualizing 
totality of all that is – namely, the Absolute itself. This embodies 
Hegel’s fundamental convictions that reality is wholly rational and 
that whatever is rational must be real. Human thought is merely one 
portion of the Becoming of Absolute Spirit, which is (through us) 
thinking and creating itself as it goes. Even this development, as 
Hegel described it in the ‘Phenomenology of Spirit’, is best 
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understood as the triadic transition from subjective to objective to 
absolute Spirit. 
Subjective Spirit 
Considered as subjective, Spirit may be observed, through 
truths about human nature described by the discipline of psychology, 
in the structure of thought exhibited by each individual human being. 
In every concrete instantiation, consciousness strives to reach perfect 
knowledge and the path of its struggle can, of course, be described as 
the movement from thesis through antithesis to synthesis: 
The first level of consciousness is that of sensory awareness 
of objects. Despite the fact that sensory images invariably appear to 
us as concrete particulars, wholly unrelated to each other, we 
naturally universalize the apparent regularities of their appearance, 
imposing upon them the forms of space and time and the generalized 
laws of nature. 
Recognition of the role we ourselves play in the origination of 
these Kantian regulative principles, Hegel supposed, leads us directly 
to the antithesis of sensory experience, the self-conscious awareness 
of the individual thinker, who acknowledges self as individual ego. 
Although this ultimately implies the existence of other selves as well, 
its immediate consequence is a tendency toward skepticism about the 
world of objects.  
But Hegel held that these levels are transcended by their 
synthesis in universal consciousness, an abstract awareness of one’s 
own place within the greater scheme of absolute spirit. The objects of 
my experience and my awareness of myself are unified by the 
recognition that each is wholly contained in the fundamental reality 
of a common whole. Here the faculty of reason is crucial, since it 
most clearly draws upon what is common to us all. 
Objective Spirit 
Considered objectively, Spirit involves the interaction among 
many selves that are the proper subject of ethics and social or 
political theory. Once again, of course, Hegel maintained that a 
correct understanding of these fields is to be derived not by 
generalizing from what we observe, but rather by tracing the dialectic 
through new triads. 
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Ethics, on Hegel’s view, begins with the concept of freedom 
understood as the right of each individual human being to act 
independently in pursuit of its own self-interest. The antithesis to this 
is the emergence of moral rules, which require the imposition of duty 
as a constraint upon the natural liberty of human desire. The 
synthesis of the two for Hegel is ‘the ethical life’, which emerges 
from a sincere recognition of the significance of one’s own stake in 
the greater good of the whole. 
Political order has its origins in family life, in which the basic 
needs of all individuals are served by mutual feeling, without any 
formal principle of organization. The antithesis to this is civil life, in 
which the incorporation of so many more individual units often leads 
to a system of purely formal regulation of conduct, demanded by law 
without any emotional bond. The synthesis of the two, then, is the 
State, which Hegel believed to unite society into a sort of civil 
family, organized in legal fashion but bound together by a profound 
emotional sense of devotion.  
According to Hegel, then, the modern nation must serve as an 
actualization of the self-conscious ethical will of a people. Although 
this sounds something like Rousseau’s general will, Hegel’s version 
puts all of the emphasis on the collective expression of what is best 
for the people rather than on each individual’s capacity to discover it 
for herself or himself. This view of the state fits well with the rise of 
modern nationalism in Europe during the nineteenth century, where 
the national spirit of each group emerges distinctively from every 
other. 
Absolute Spirit 
Finally, when considered most purely, as absolute in itself, 
Spirit is just the historical process of human thought toward ever-
greater awareness of the fundamental unity of all reality. In order to 
see how the Absolute gradually discovers and expresses its own 
nature, Hegel proposed, we need only observe the way in which the 
Spirit of the World (Weltgeist) develops dialectically in three 
distinguishable arenas, a triad of triads through which human culture 
achieves its transcendental aim. 
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Since it appreciates and evaluates the Absolute entirely 
through its presentations among the senses, Art is first to be 
considered. Effective artistic expression, Hegel supposed, must 
always transcend the subject/object dichotomy by leading us to 
awareness of some underlying unity. Historically, human art has 
embodied the dialectical development of the Absolute’s sensory 
being, starting with the thesis of symbolic representation of natural 
objects and proceeding to its antithesis in highly stylized classical art 
before rising to the synthesis of Romantic expression. 
The antithesis of Art as a whole is the abstract notion of the 
Absolute as an objectified other, the divine being contemplated by 
Religion. Although traditional religion often speaks of god in 
personal terms, its theological exposition usually emphasizes the 
radical differentness of the deity and its incomprehensibility to us. 
Again, the historical development of religion displays a dialectical 
structure: the thesis is worship of nature, which gives rise to a 
religion of individuality tempered by revealed law and both are 
transcended in the synthesis of Protestant Christianity, which unifies 
them under the notion of god in human form. 
This leaves room for the grand culminating synthesis of 
human culture, which is (of course!) Philosophy, in which the 
Absolute learns to cognize itself in perfectly literal terms. As the self-
conscious awareness of the Absolute, Hegel’s philosophy unifies the 
sensibility of art and the objectivication of religion by regarding the 
dialectical logic of reason as the ultimate structure of reality. Here, 
too, there has been historical development, most recently the 
emergence of absolute idealism as a synthesis transcending the 
dispute between empiricism and rationalism. 
The Inexorability of History 
As we have already seen, Hegel’s view of the world is 
determinedly historical; he believed that history itself (involving 
another triad of original/reflective/philosophical history) exhibits the 
growth of self-consciousness in the Absolute, the process of 
development by means of which the Spirit of the World (Weltgeist) 
comes to know itself. But since history inevitably follows the pattern 
of logical necessity through the dialectical movement from thesis to 
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antithesis to synthesis, the present age must be the highest stage of 
development. Certainly Hegel regarded the cultural achievements of 
his own time – nationalism, romanticism, Protestantism and idealism 
– as the culmination of all that had gone before, with his own 
philosophical work as its highest expression. Here is nineteenth-
century optimism at its peak, full of self-confidence in the 
possibilities of rationality and enlightenment. Many thinkers of the 
nearly two centuries since Hegel’s time have raised serious questions 
about the reliability of this modernist promise. 
Three Laws of Dialectics 
‘Dialectics is nothing more than the science of the general 
laws of motion and development of nature, human society and 
thought’ (Engels). 
Hegel assembled inside his idealistic philosophy the three 
laws of dialectics: 
1. The law of the unity and conflict of opposites (Heraclitus). 
2. The law of the passage of quantitative changes into 
qualitative changes (Aristotle). 
3. The law of the negation of the negation (Hegel). 
Law of Opposites 
Hegel started with the observation that everything in existence 
is a unity of opposites. For example, electricity is characterized by a 
positive and negative charge and atoms consist of protons and 
electrons which are unified but are ultimately contradictory forces. 
Even humans through introspection find that they are a unity of 
opposite qualities. Masculinity and femininity, selfishness and 
altruism, humbleness and pride, and so forth. The Hegel’s conclusion 
being that everything ‘contains two mutually incompatible and 
exclusive but nevertheless equally essential and indispensable parts 
or aspects’. The basic concept being that this unity of opposites in 
nature is the thing that makes each entity auto-dynamic and provides 
this constant motivation for movement and change: ‘Contradiction in 
nature is the root of all motion and of all life’. 
This dichotomy is often found in nature. A star is held 
together by gravity trying to push all the molecules to the centre, and 
heat trying to send them as far from the centre as possible. If either 
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force is completely successful the star ceases to be, if heat is 
victorious it explodes into a supernova, if gravity is victorious it 
implodes into a neutron star or a black hole. Furthermore, living 
things strive to balance internal and external forces to maintain 
homeostasis, which is nothing more than a balance of opposing 
forces such as acidity and alkalinity. 
Some opposites are antagonistic, as in the competition 
between capitalists and labourers. Factory owners offer the lowest 
wages possible, while workers seek to maximize wages. Sometimes 
this antagonism sparks strikes or lockouts. 
Law of Transformation 
This law states that continuous quantitative development 
results in qualitative ‘leaps’ in nature whereby a completely new 
form or entity is produced. This is how ‘quantitative development 
becomes qualitative change’. Transformation allows for the reverse 
with quality affecting quantity. 
This theory draws many parallels to the theory of Evolution. 
Marxist philosophers concluded that entities, through quantitative 
accumulations, are also inherently capable of ‘leaps’ to new forms 
and levels of reality. The law illustrates that during a long period of 
time, through a process of small, almost irrelevant accumulations, 
nature develops noticeable changes in direction. 
This can be illustrated by the eruption of a volcano which is 
caused by years of pressure building up. The volcano may no longer 
be a mountain but when its lava cools it will become fertile land 
where previously there was none. A revolution which is caused by 
years of tensions between opposing factions in society acts as a social 
illustration. The law occurs in reverse. An example would be, that by 
introducing better (changing quality) tools to farm, the tools will aid 
the increase in the amount (change the quantity) of what is produced. 
Law of Negation 
The law of negation was created to account for the tendency 
in nature to constantly increase the numerical quantity of all things. 
Hegel demonstrated that entities tend to negate themselves in order to 
advance or reproduce a higher quantity. This means that the nature of 
opposition which produces conflict in each element and gives them 
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motion also tends to negate the thing itself. This dynamic process of 
birth and destruction is what causes entities to advance. This law is 
commonly simplified as the cycle of thesis, antithesis and synthesis 
(the Hegelian dialectical formula: A (thesis) versus B (anti-thesis) 
equals C (synthesis). This method is to trace the evolution of this 
dynamic principle through three stages: 
1) the stage in which it affirms or posits itself as thesis; 
2) the stage of negation, limitation, antithesis, which is a 
necessary corollary of the previous stage; 
3) the stage of synthesis, return to itself, union of opposites, 
which follows necessarily on (l) and (2). 
For example: If (A) my idea of freedom conflicts with (B) 
your idea of freedom then (C) neither of us can be free until everyone 
agrees to be a slave. 
Other example (a core of Hegel’s teaching): Absolute being in 
the first stage is the idea simply (the subject-matter of logic); in the 
second stage (of otherness) it becomes nature (philosophy of nature); 
in the third stage (of return or synthesis) it is spirit (philosophy of 
spirit – ethics, politics, art, religion, etc.). 
In nature, Hegel often cited the case of the barley seed which, 
in its natural state, germinates and out of its own death or negation 
produces a plant; the plant in turn grows to maturity, and is itself 
negated after bearing many barley seeds. Thus, all nature is 
constantly expanding through cycles. 
In society, we have the case of class. For example, the 
aristocracy was negated by the bourgeoisie; and the bourgeoisie then 
created the proletariat that will one day negate them. This illustrates 
that the cycle of negation is eternal, as each class creates its ‘grave-
digger’, its successor, as soon as it finishes burying its creator. 
Other famous German philosopher, political economist, 
historian, political theorist, sociologist Karl Heinrich Marx (1818–
1883) was born and educated in Prussia, where he fell under the 
influence of Ludwig Feuerbach and other radical Hegelians. 
Although he shared Hegel’s belief in dialectical structure and 
historical inevitability, Marx held that the foundations of reality lay 
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in the material base of economics rather than in the abstract thought 
of idealistic philosophy. 
Marxism is a political philosophy, as well as an economic and 
sociological worldview, which is based upon a materialist 
interpretation of history, a Marxist analysis and critique of capitalism, 
a theory of social change and a view of human liberation derived 
from the work of German philosophers Karl Marx (1818–1883) and 
Friedrich Engels (1820–1895). The three primary aspects of 
Marxism are: 
1. The dialectical and materialist concept of history. 
Humankind’s history fundamentally is a struggle between social 
classes. The productive capacity of society is the foundation of 
society, and as this capacity increases over time the social relations of 
production, class relations, evolve through this struggle of the classes 
and pass through definite stages (primitive communism, slavery, 
feudalism, capitalism). The legal, political, ideological and other 
aspects (e.g. art) of society are derived from these production 
relations as is the consciousness of the individuals of which the 
society is composed. 
2. The critique of capitalism. Marx argues that in capitalist 
society, an economic minority (the bourgeoisie) dominate and exploit 
an economic majority (the proletariat). Marx argues that capitalism is 
exploitative, specifically the way in which unpaid labour (surplus 
value) is extracted from the working class (the labour theory of 
value), extending and critiquing the work of earlier political 
economists on value. Such commodification of human labour 
according to Marx, creates an arrangement of transitory serfdom. He 
argued that while the production process is socialized, ownership 
remains in the hands of the bourgeoisie. This forms the fundamental 
contradiction of capitalist society. Without the elimination of the 
fetter of the private ownership of the means of production, human 
society is unable to achieve further development. 
3. Advocacy of proletarian revolution. In order to overcome 
the fetters of private property the working class must seize political 
power internationally through a social revolution and expropriate the 
capitalist classes around the world and place the productive capacities 
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of society into collective ownership. Upon this, material foundation 
classes would be abolished and the material basis for all forms of 
inequality between humankind would dissolve. 
Alienation 
The core of Marx’s economic analysis found early expression 
in the ‘Economic and Political Manuscripts of 1844’. There, Marx 
argued that the conditions of modern industrial societies invariably 
result in the estrangement (or alienation) of workers from their own 
labour. In his creative work Marx identifies four types of alienation 
in labour under capitalism. These include: 
1. Alienation of the worker from the work he produces, 
from the product of his labour. The product’s design and the 
manner in which it is produced are determined not by its actual 
producers but rather by the Capitalist class. Aside from the lack of 
workers’ control over the design and production protocol, this form 
of alienation also refers to the conversion of the use value of a 
product into an exchange value. In other words, the Capitalist gains 
control of the worker and the beneficial effects of his work by setting 
up a system that converts the worker’s efforts not only into a useful 
thing capable of benefiting consumers, but also into an illusory thing 
itself – something called ‘work’ – which is compensated in the form 
of wages at a rate as low as possible to maintain a maximum rate of 
return on the industrialist’s investment capital (an aspect of 
Exploitation). Furthermore, the exchange value that could be 
generated by the sale of products and returned to workers in the form 
of profits is absconded with by the managerial and capitalist classes. 
2. Alienation of the worker from working, from the act of 
producing itself. This kind of alienation refers to the patterning of 
work in the Capitalist Mode of Production into an endless sequence 
of discrete, repetitive, trivial and meaningless motions, offering little, 
if any, intrinsic satisfaction. The worker’s labour power is 
commodified into exchange value itself in the form of wages. A 
worker is thus estranged from the unmediated relation to his activity 
via such wages. Aside from the limitation of the inherent plurality of 
one’s species being that the Capitalist division of labour imposes 
upon workers, Marx was also identifying another feature of 
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exploitation with this kind of alienation. According to Marx, one’s 
species being is fulfilled when it maintains control over the subject of 
its labour by the ability to determine how it shall be used directly or 
exchanged for something else. Capitalism removes the right of the 
worker to exercise control over the value or effects of his labour, 
robbing him of the ability to either consume the product he makes 
directly or receive the full value of the product when it is sold: this is 
the first alienation of worker from product. However, the first 
alienation contributes to the second alienation of worker from the 
very act of working, as it removes the worker’s feeling of control 
over the use and exchange of his labour power. This loss of control 
disrupts the ability of the worker to specialize, focus, direct or apply 
the inherently plural potency of his species being, thus separating or 
alienating any activity that he does engage in from the intentional 
core of that being. 
3. Alienation of the worker from himself as a producer, 
from his or her ‘species being’ or ‘essence as a species’. To Marx, 
this human essence was is separate from activity or work, nor static, 
but includes the innate potential to develop as a human organism. 
Species being is a concept that Marx deploys to refer to what he sees 
as the original or intrinsic essence of the species, which is 
characterized both by plurality and dynamism: all beings possess the 
tendency and desire to engage in multiple activities to promote their 
mutual survival, comfort and sense of interconnection. A man’s value 
consists in his ability to conceive of the ends of his action as 
purposeful ideas distinct from any given step of realizing them: man 
is able to objectify his intentional efforts in an idea of himself (the 
subject) and an idea of the thing which he produces (the object). 
Animals, according to Marx, do not objectify themselves or their 
products as ideas because they engage in self-sustaining actions 
directly, without sustained future projection or conscious intention. 
While human nature or essence does not exist apart from specific, 
historically conditioned activity, it becomes actualized as man’s 
species being when man – within his historical circumstances – is 
free to subordinate his will to the demands imposed by his own 
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imagination and not those mandated solely for the purpose of 
allowing others to do so. 
Notwithstanding, the character of an individual’s 
consciousness (his will and imagination) is conditioned by his 
relationship to that which facilitates survival; since any individual’s 
survival and betterment is fundamentally dependent upon cooperation 
with others, a given person’s personal consciousness is determined 
intersubjectively or collectively rather than merely subjectively or 
individually. As far as has been heretofore observed, all societies 
have, according to Marx, organized groups with differing basic 
relationships to the means of material survival available to them – 
i.e., the means of production. One group has owned and controlled 
the means while another has operated them, the goal of the former 
being to benefit as much as possible through the latter’s efforts. 
Every time there is a shift in the organization of the means of 
production – as with say, the displacement of agrarian feudalism and 
pre-industrial mercantilism with the technologies that gave rise to 
Industrial Capitalism – there is a rearrangement and rupture of the 
social class structure that relates to those means – a class structure 
Marx termed the relations of production. That is to say, a new class 
relationship emerges, subordinating one group and the species beings 
of its members to the activities and corresponding values that enable 
it to operate the means of production for the profit of the dominant 
group, whose consciousness and values are also conditioned to 
maintain this dominance. 
While industrialization holds the promise of the masses’ 
eventual liberation from an imagination conditioned chiefly by brute 
necessity, the division of labour within Industrial Capitalism blunts 
the worker’s ‘species being’ and renders him as a replaceable cog in 
an abstract machine instead of a human being capable of defining his 
own value through direct, purposeful activity. And yet, 
industrialization, in Marx’s view, would eventually progress to a state 
of near-total mechanization and automation of productive processes. 
During this progression, the newly dominant Bourgeoisie Capitalist 
class would exploit the Industrial working class or Proletariat to the 
degree that the value they excised from their labour would begin to 
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infringe upon the ability of the Proletariat to materially survive. 
When this begins to occur and when the productive forces are 
sufficiently developed, there will be a final revolution whose end 
result will be the reorientation of the relations of production to the 
means of production in a Communist mode of production. In the 
Communist mode of production, because all members of the society 
will relate to the means of production on a fundamentally equal and 
non-conflictual manner, there will be no fundamental differentiation 
between groups or classes as previously, and the species being of 
every individual will assume a full actualization of its tendencies, as 
the application of the his efforts will return to him in direct, 
unmediated proportion to what he is able to conceive. This is partly 
due to the fact that a Communist society would distribute the benefits 
and duties of production evenly, in accordance with the capacities its 
members, such that each member could direct his action more 
directly towards his interests and preferences rather than a narrowly 
designated function designed to generate maximal return of value to 
an owner. 
In this classless, collectively managed society, the dialectical 
exchange of value between one worker’s objectified labour power 
(via production) and another’s benefit from that objectification (via 
consumption) will not be directed by the narrow interest of one group 
over the needs of another, and will thus directly enrich the 
consciousness and material state of all of producers and consumers to 
the maximal possible degree. Though production will still be 
differentiated to some degree, it will be directed by the collective 
demand and not the narrow demand of one class at the expense of 
those of another. Since ownership will be shared, the relation of 
individuals’ consciousness to the mode of production will be 
identical and will assume the character that corresponds, as in 
previous times, to the interest of its group: the universal, Communist 
class. The direct, un-siphoned return of the fruit of each worker’s 
labour to that group’s interest – and thus as directly as possible to his 
own interest, which assumes the character of his group’s – will 
constitute an un-alienated state of labour, restoring the worker to the 
fullest exercise and determination of his species being as is possible 
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at any given moment in the future development of Communist 
society. 
4. Alienation of the worker from other workers or 
producers. Capitalism reduces labour to a commercial commodity to 
be traded on the market, rather than a social relationship between 
people involved in a common effort for survival or betterment. The 
competitive labour market is set up in Industrial Capitalist economies 
to extract as much value as possible in the form of capital from those 
who work to those who own enterprises and other assets that control 
the means of production. This causes the relations of production to 
become conflictual... i.e., it pits worker against worker, alienating 
members of the same class from their mutual interest, an effect Marx 
called False Consciousness. 
Historical materialism 
‘Society does not consist of individuals, but expresses the sum 
of interrelations, the relations within which these individuals stand’ 
(Karl Marx). 
The historical materialist theory of history, also synonymous 
to ‘the economic interpretation of history’, looks for the causes of 
societal development and change in the collective ways humans use 
to make the means for living. The social features of a society (social 
classes, political structures, ideologies) derive from economic 
activity. 
Marx’s analysis of history focuses on the organization of 
labour and depends on his distinction between: 
1) the means / forces of production, literally those things 
(like land, natural resources and technology) necessary for the 
production of material goods; 
2) the relations of production, in other words, the social 
relationships people enter into as they acquire and use the means of 
production. 
Together these compose the mode of production, and Marx 
distinguished historical eras in terms of distinct modes of production. 
For example, he observed that European societies had progressed 
from a feudal mode of production to a capitalist mode of production. 
Marx believed that under capitalism, the means of production change 
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more rapidly than the relations of production. Marx regarded this 
mismatch between (economic) base and (social) superstructure as a 
major source of social disruption and conflict. 
Base and Superstructure 
The base and superstructure metaphor explains that the 
totality of social relations regarding ‘the social production of their 
existence’ i.e. civil society forms a society’s economic base, from 
which rises a superstructure of political and legal institutions i.e. 
political society. The base corresponds to the social consciousness 
(politics, religion, philosophy, etc.) and it conditions the 
superstructure and the social consciousness. A conflict between the 
development of material productive forces and the relations of 
production provokes social revolutions, thus, the resultant changes to 
the economic base will lead to the transformation of the 
superstructure. This relationship is reflexive; the base determines the 
superstructure, in the first instance, and remains the foundation of a 
form of social organization which then can act again upon both parts 
of the base and superstructure, whose relationship is dialectical, not 
literal. 
Historical Periodization 
Marx considered that these socio-economic conflicts have 
historically manifested themselves as distinct stages (one transitional) 
of development in Western Europe: 
1. Primitive communism: as in co-operative tribal societies. 
2. Slave society: development of tribal progression to city-
state; Aristocracy is born. 
3. Feudalism: aristocrats are the ruling class; merchants 
evolve into capitalists. 
4. Capitalism: capitalists are the ruling class, who create and 
employ the proletariat. 
5. Socialism: workers gain class consciousness, and via 
proletarian revolution depose the capitalist dictatorship of the 
bourgeoisie, replacing it in turn with dictatorship of the proletariat 
through which the socialization of the means of production can be 
realized. 
6. Communism: a classless and stateless society. 
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Communism 
Communism is system of social organization in which all 
property is owned by the community and each person contributes and 
receives according to their ability and needs. The distinctive features 
of communist society are: 
1. Common ownership is a principle according to which the 
assets of an enterprise or other organization are held indivisibly 
rather than in the names of the individual members or by a public 
institution such as a governmental body. 
2. Egalitarianism (derived from the French word égal, 
meaning ‘equal’) is the belief that all people are equal and should 
have the same rights and opportunities. 
3. Classless society refers to a society in which no one is born 
into a social class. Such distinctions of wealth, income, education, 
culture or social network as might arise, in such a society would only 
be determined by individual experience and achievement. 
Social Classes 
Class is the system of ordering a society in which people are 
divided into sets based on perceived economic and cultural status. 
For Marx: ‘The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of 
class struggles’ (‘The Communist Manifesto’, Chapter 1). The 
identity of a social class derives from its relationship to the means of 
production; Marx describes the social classes in capitalist societies: 
1. Proletariat: ‘those individuals who sell their labour power, 
and who, in the capitalist mode of production, do not own the means 
of production’. The capitalist mode of production establishes the 
conditions enabling the bourgeoisie to exploit the proletariat because 
the workers’ labour generates a surplus value greater than the 
workers’ wages. 
2. Bourgeoisie: those who ‘own the means of production’ and 
buy labour power from the proletariat, thus exploiting the proletariat; 
they subdivide as bourgeoisie and the petit bourgeoisie. 
3. Petit bourgeoisie are those who employ labourers, but who 
also work, i.e. small business owners, peasant landlords, trade 
workers et al. Marxism predicts that the continual reinvention of the 
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means of production eventually would destroy the petit bourgeoisie, 
degrading them from the middle class to the proletariat. 
4. Lumpenproletariat: criminals, vagabonds, beggars, et al., 
who have no stake in the economy, and so sell their labour to the 
highest bidder. 
5. Landlords: an historically important social class who 
retain some wealth and power. 
6. Peasantry and farmers: a disorganized class incapable of 
effecting socio-economic change, most of whom would enter the 
proletariat, and some become landlords. 
Class Consciousness 
Class consciousness denotes the awareness – of itself and the 
social world – that a social class possesses, and its capacity to 
rationally act in their best interests; hence, class consciousness is 
required before they can effect a successful revolution. 
World Revolution 
World revolution is the Marxist concept of overthrowing 
capitalism in all countries through the conscious revolutionary action 
of the organized working class. These revolutions would not 
necessarily occur simultaneously, but where local conditions allowed 
a revolutionary party to successfully replace bourgeois ownership 
and rule, and install a workers’ state based on social ownership of the 
means of production. The end goal is to achieve world socialism, and 
later, stateless communism. 
 
Checklist 
 
1. What is the specificity of Classical German philosophy? 
2. Highlight the basic principles of Immanuel Kant’s epistemology 
and his ethical views. 
3. Characterize the main specifics of Georg Hegel’s dialectics and its 
impact on modern science development. 
4. What are the basic theoretical principles of Karl Marx’s 
philosophy of history? What is the essence of his doctrine about 
socioeconomic structures and theory of alienation? 
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5. What are the positive and negative aspects of the communist social 
order? 
6. What is the difference between socialism and communism? 
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Conceptual dictionary 
 
A posteriori judgments – those are grounded upon 
experience and require empirical justification. They are consequently 
limited and uncertain in their application to specific cases. 
A priori judgments – those are based upon reason alone, 
independently of all sensory experience, and therefore apply with 
strict universality. 
Alienation – (in Marxist theory) a condition of workers in a 
capitalist economy, resulting from a lack of identity with the products 
of their labour and a sense of being controlled or exploited. 
Analytic judgments – those whose predicates are wholly 
contained in their subjects; since they add nothing to our concept of 
the subject, such judgments are purely explicative and can be 
deduced from the principle of non-contradiction. 
Antinomy (antinomies) – a contradiction between two 
beliefs, statements or conclusions, both apparently obtained by 
correct reasoning; a paradox. 
Antithesis – (in Hegelian philosophy) the negation of the 
thesis as the second stage in the process of dialectical reasoning. 
Apperception – the mental process by which a person makes 
sense of an idea by assimilating it to the body of ideas he or she 
already possesses. 
Axiology (also called value theory) – the branch of 
philosophy concerned with the nature of value and with what kinds of 
things have value. 
Essence – (in Spinozism) the ideal realm, eternal and outside 
of time. 
Existence – (in Spinozism) the material realm, mortal and 
being in time. 
Deduction – the inference of particular instances by reference 
to a general law or principle. 
Deism – the belief in the existence of a supreme being, 
specifically of a creator who does not intervene in the universe. The 
term is used chiefly of an intellectual movement of the XVII–XVIII 
centuries that accepted the existence of a creator on the basis of 
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reason but rejected belief in a supernatural deity who interacts with 
humankind. 
Determinism (necessitarianism) – the doctrine that all 
events, including human choices and decisions, have sufficient 
causes. 
Dialectic – 1) the art of investigating or discussing the truth of 
opinions; 2) inquiry into metaphysical contradictions and their 
solutions; 3) the branch of methodology, which represent 
development as the spiral motion. Each new coil of history repeats 
previous, but introduces new products and changes. 
Dualism – a philosophical theory that regards a domain of 
reality in terms of two independent principles, especially mind and 
matter (Cartesian dualism). 
Empiricism – the theory that all knowledge is based on 
experience derived from the senses. Stimulated by the rise of 
experimental science, it developed in the XVII–XVIII centuries, 
expounded in particular by John Locke, George Berkeley and David 
Hume. 
Induction – a method of reasoning in which you use 
individual ideas or facts to give you a general rule or conclusion. 
Monad – (in the philosophy of Leibniz) an unextended, 
indivisible and indestructible entity that is the basic or ultimate 
constituent of the universe and a microcosm of it. 
Noumenon – 1) the object, itself inaccessible to experience, 
to which a phenomenon is referred for the basis or cause of its sense 
content; 2) a thing in itself, as distinguished from a phenomenon or 
thing as it appears; 3) (in Kantian philosophy) something that can be 
the object only of a purely intellectual, nonsensuous intuition. 
Pantheism – the doctrine that God is the transcendent reality 
of which the material universe and human beings are only 
manifestations: it involves a denial of God’s personality and 
expresses a tendency to identify God and nature. 
Parallelism – Spinoza's teaching, which holds that the mind 
is constituted by its idea of the body and that mental and physical 
(thought and extension) phenomena occur in parallel, but without 
causal interaction between them. 
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Phenomenology – a philosophical movement, founded in the 
early years of the XX century by German thinker Edmund Husserl, 
which deals with consciousness, thought and experience. 
Phenomenon – 1) an appearance or immediate object of 
awareness in experience; 2) (in Kantianism) a thing as it appears to 
and is constructed by the mind, as distinguished from a noumenon or 
thing-in-itself. 
Rationalism – the theory that reason rather than experience is 
the foundation of certainty in knowledge. 
Sensualism – the belief that cognition should be based on 
senses and emotions, rather than reason and logic. 
Substance – 1) something that exists by itself and in which 
accidents or attributes inhere; that which receives modifications and 
is not itself a mode; something that is causally active; something that 
is more than an event; 2) the essential part of a thing; essence; 3) a 
thing considered as a continuing whole. 
Synthesis – (in Hegelian philosophy) the final stage in the 
process of dialectical reasoning, in which a new idea resolves the 
conflict between thesis and antithesis. 
Synthetic judgments – are those whose predicates are wholly 
distinct from their subjects, to which they must be shown to relate 
because of some real connection external to the concepts themselves. 
Hence, synthetic judgments are genuinely informative but require 
justification by reference to some outside principle. 
Thesis – (in Hegelian philosophy) a proposition forming the 
first stage in the process of dialectical reasoning. 
Transcendentalism – any system of philosophy, esp. that of 
Kant, holding that the key to knowledge of the nature of reality lies in 
the critical examination of the processes of reason on which depends 
the nature of experience. 
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